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SIDELINING SUBSIDIARITY: UNITED
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
“LEGISLATION” AND ITS INFRA-LAW
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I
INTRODUCTION
The principle of subsidiarity has a logic of legitimacy that strives to allocate
responsibility at the national level in order to bring decisionmaking closer to
those affected by it. Legitimacy is not the only reason for allocating competence
to the national level. In some cases, such as the United Nations Security
Council’s (UNSC) schemes to prevent terrorist financing and the proliferation
of chemical, biological, and nuclear (CBN) weapons, decisions about where to
allocate responsibility are made for reasons of effectiveness. Treating these
1
security threats as “weakest-link goods,” the UNSC has aimed to decenter the
administration of collective security away from itself by harnessing individual
nation-states so as to create a completely regulated international sphere in
which terrorists and proliferators are starved of means and opportunities to
perpetrate attacks. In pursuit of this goal, the UNSC has sought to create shared
frameworks for action by carving out a new quasi-legislative power. In an
attempt to quell criticism of this move, the UNSC reassured states that they will
retain national control over the implementation of their obligations, thereby
satisfying the principle of subsidiarity. In effect, however, subsidiarity has been
sidelined by the UNSC’s strategy of implementation. The UNSC’s strategy
employs disciplinary power to generate an infra-law at the level of technical
2
detail and to “normalize” states according to it. Discipline shares the UNSC’s
logic of effectiveness and subsidiarity’s preference for national responsibility,
but it operates below the surface of the formal law and out of the reach of
subsidiarity. It offers a notion of national responsibility shorn of national
control.
The argument proceeds as follows. Subsidiarity’s logic of legitimacy is
briefly considered in part II, which concentrates on the logic of effectiveness
underlying the UNSC’s schemes. The disparity between the open-textured
norms on the face of the UNSC’s quasi-legislative resolutions and the
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disciplinary work of its subsidiary bodies is the focus of part III. The Financial
Action Task Force’s (FATF) recommendations on money laundering and
terrorist financing are shown to constitute disciplinary infra-law of the
legislative resolutions in part IV, which also offers an illustration of discipline’s
negative effect on national control.
A. Logics of Effectiveness and Legitimacy
Whereas the principle of subsidiarity has a logic of legitimacy, the UNSC’s
approach to the prevention of terrorist financing and CBN proliferation has a
logic of effectiveness. These logics are incompatible. The UNSC’s reasoning is
totalizing; it treats the international realm as a bounded space that transnational
threats cannot escape as they can the boundaries of nation-states. If this
bounded space can be controlled, then, the logic continues, it may be possible to
deprive terrorists and proliferators of the conditions they need to succeed, such
as financial support, manpower, open borders, lax import–export controls, and
corrupt or incompetent criminal-justice systems. The Council has framed the
problem of preventing these threats as a “weakest link good” that makes every
gap, deficiency, and malpractice a potential, however remote, impediment to
achieving a totally regulated space and thereby preventing international
3
terrorism and CBN proliferation.
Achieving this in practice is no easy task. The UNSC cannot regulate the
international realm on its own, as it is dependent on UN member states to carry
4
out its decisions. Given this setup and the UNSC’s unrepresentative post–
World War II composition, it has adopted a strategy of using UN member states
as nodes in a decentralized scheme of administering the entire international—
not global—space. Total regulation of aspects of this space is needed to deprive
terrorists and proliferators of means of operation and opportunities to operate.
The success of the schemes depends on the capacity of all states to control their
borders, maintain an effective criminal justice system, and institute adequate
financial regulation. The UNSC’s logic of effectiveness demands the eradication
of all weak links, and gaps, in regulation.
The principle of subsidiarity strives to bring decisionmaking closer to those
affected, but neither the principle of subsidiarity nor its logic of legitimacy is
absolute. The claim that low-level decisionmaking is not ipso facto more
legitimate is considered below. The principle of subsidiarity, unlike the concept
of sovereignty, is limited because it can be displaced by reasons of
5
effectiveness. On this reading, subsidiarity is “a rebuttable presumption for the
3. For a good example of this, see S.C. Res. 2199, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2199 (Feb. 12, 2015)
(stressing that “terrorism can only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving
the active participation and collaboration of all States and international and regional organizations to
impede, impair, isolate and incapacitate the terrorist threat”).
4. See U.N. Charter art. 25 (“Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the
decision of the Security Council in accordance with the . . . Charter.”).
5. See Markus Jachtenfuchs & Nico Krisch, Subsidiarity in Global Governance, 79 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 1, 18–19.
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local” that can be displaced by evidence that action at a higher level is more
likely to be effective. This model of subsidiarity is employed by the Treaty on
European Union, which holds that “the Union shall act only if and in so far as
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
7
Member States” because decisions should be taken “as closely as possible to
8
the citizen.” The notion that the preference for the local can be overridden by
considerations of effectiveness can also be found in the Roman-Catholic
principle of subsidiarity:
Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their
own initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice . . . to
assign to
a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations
9
can do.

Like EU subsidiarity, the Catholic version premises the preference for the
local on the capacity of entities to accomplish given objectives. As pointed out
by the special editors of this issue, the most contentious matter is often where
10
the threshold lies for displacing the preference for the local.
For certain collective-action problems, the threshold is fairly low. This is
usually the case where collective security is concerned; arguments based on the
importance of autonomy in decisionmaking and national diversity lack bite
against arguments that coordinated action is required to tackle a common
existential threat. The UN Charter reflects this sort of thinking because of the
unprecedentedly potent tools with which the UNSC is equipped and the broad
11
discretion it has to interpret and deploy them. Exceptionally, the UNSC is
empowered to decide to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
12
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” as well as
“measures not involving the use of armed force” in order “to give effect to its
13
decisions.” As the formulation in Article 24(1) affirms, the UNSC was built on
a principle of effectiveness, and member states conferred on the UNSC its
“primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
14
security” “in order to ensure prompt and effective action.” Effectiveness
concerns squeeze out legitimacy concerns and the principle of nonintervention
15
“in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state,”

6. Id. at 6.
7. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 18.
8. Id. pmbl.
9. POPE PIUS XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO ¶ 46, (1931). For more on the Catholic principle of
subsidiarity, see Nicholas Barber, The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity, 11 EUR. L. J. 308, 310 (2005).
10. Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 5, at 7.
11. See Nico Krisch, Introduction to Chapter VII: The General Framework, in 2 THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1239, 1243 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012) (explaining
that the powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter are “extremely farreaching and subject to very few express limitations”).
12. U.N. Charter art. 42.
13. Id. art. 41.
14. Id. art. 24, ¶ 1.
15. Id. art. 1, ¶ 7.
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a principle designed to protect members’ sovereignty, is expressly made
subject to Chapter VII.
The UNSC’s inclination for effectiveness over legitimacy is all the more
striking given its notorious legitimacy deficit. The UNSC is neither
representative nor accountable. As Koskenniemi suggested, “[T]he dominant
role of the permanent five [P5], the secrecy of the Council’s procedures, the
lack of a clearly delimited competence and the absence of what might be called
a legal culture within the Council hardly justify enthusiasm about its increased
17
role in world affairs.”
All states recognized this in 2005 when heads of state agreed that the UNSC
18
must become “more broadly representative, efficient and transparent.” A
particular issue has been the five permanent members’ privileged position in the
UNSC. They can effectively veto attempts to interfere with their own
19
jurisdictional autonomy while simultaneously exerting enormous influence
over Chapter VII decisions that affect states’ control within their domestic
20
spheres. This institutional imbalance was the result of a bargain struck when
the Charter was drafted in which the great powers of 1945 agreed to guarantee
21
international peace and security in return for institutional privileges. The
Charter allows the permanent members to use their collective might for the
collective security of everyone in situations that threaten international peace
22
and security. In situations falling short of this threshold, the UNSC’s powers to
deprive states of national control is much more limited. For example, the
23
consent of the parties is one of the core principles of UN peacekeeping, and
24
although member states are obliged to settle their disputes by peaceful means,
the UNSC can do no more than make “recommendations” to the parties so long
25
as disputes do not constitute a threat to international peace and security. The
existence of Article 39 as a limit on national control and UNSC intervention,

16. Georg Nolte, Article 2(7), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 280,
310 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012).
17. Martti Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple: Order, Justice and the UN: A Dialectical View, 6
EUR. J. INT’L L. 325, 327 (1995).
18. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 153, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
19. See U.N. Charter supra note 4, at art. 27, ¶ 3 (providing that Security Council decisions shall
be made with concurring votes of the permanent members).
20. See, e.g., Kishore Mahbubani, The Permanent and Elected Council Members, in THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 253, 258 (D.M. Malone ed., 2004)
(noting the five permanent members’ “domination” of the Security Council).
21. See Rep. of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World:
Our Shared Responsibility, ¶ 244, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) (explaining that the permanent
members of the Security Council “were given veto rights but were also expected to shoulder an extra
burden in promoting global security”).
22. U.N. Charter art. 39.
23. U.N. DEP’T OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DEP’T OF FIELD SUPPORT, CIVIL AFFAIRS
HANDBOOK, at 13, U.N. Sales No. E.12.VII.2 (2012).
24. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 3.
25. Id. art. 38.
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albeit a very fluid and indeterminate limit, reflects the underlying importance
of legitimacy to the effectiveness of UNSC action by circumscribing the
conditions in which the logic of effectiveness can completely displace the logic
27
of legitimacy.
B. Weakest-Link Goods and Transnational Security Challenges
The simple equation described above in which the determination of an
Article 39 situation simultaneously decides the question of where responsibility
for collective security should lie and, by extension, whether priority is given to
effectiveness or legitimacy, does not always work. This is especially evident
where transnational threats to collective security, like international terrorism,
are concerned because they are seen as posing a challenge that cannot be
resolved by coercive enforcement alone. As well as taking relatively targeted
measures with respect to material threats, such as the imposition of sanctions
28
against individuals associated with al-Qaeda, the UNSC has recently extended
its toolkit to include measures designed to prevent international terrorism—
particularly nuclear terrorism—from materializing at all. In order to do this, the
29
UNSC has used so-called “legislative” resolutions to impose obligations on
30
states to prevent and suppress the financing and support of terrorism and to
counter the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their
31
means of delivery.
This move flummoxes the association of Chapter VII with centralized, topdown action because it uses Chapter VII to institute a decentralized, bottom-up
approach to collective security in which each UN member state is a link in an
unbroken chain of counterterrorism. This strategy conceives of the prevention
of transnational threats to collective security as a “weakest-link” global public
good in which each state is conceived of as a link in an aggregate effort
32
response. The logic of allocating responsibility to nation-states is not purely a
matter of legitimacy. Rather, it is primarily driven by a scheme of administrative
26. See Nico Krisch, Article 39, in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY
1272, 1274 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012) (describing the Article 39 drafters’ intent to allow the
Security Council broad discretion).
27. A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, supra note 21, at 66.
28. S.C. Res. 1267, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
29. For analysis of the Security Council’s legislative powers, see generally Matthew Happold,
Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the United Nations, 16 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L.
593 (2003); Luis Miguel Hinojosa-Martínez, The Legislative Role of the Security Council in its Fight
Against Terrorism: Legal, Political and Practical Limits, 57 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 333 (2008); Eric
Rosand, The Security Council as ‘Global Legislator’: Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative?, 28 FORDHAM
INT’L L. J. 542 (2004); Paul Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 901 (2002).
30. S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
31. S.C. Res. 1540, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
32. See SCOTT BARRETT, WHY COOPERATE? THE INCENTIVE TO SUPPLY GLOBAL PUBLIC
GOODS 4 (2007) (distinguishing between global public goods that “can be supplied unilaterally or
minilaterally” and global public goods that “depend on the states that contribute the least.” He calls the
latter “weakest link” goods and explains that they demand an “aggregate effort’ response because the
good “depends on the combined efforts of all states.”).
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decentralization and has a logic of effectiveness. The coincidence of these two
logics masks the way that national responsibility does not guarantee national
control even though it may create the impression of doing so and, moreover,
may actively diminish states’ control over the implementation of their
obligations. This sets up the main argument of the article, discussed in parts III
and IV: that disciplinary infra-law, which shares the logic of effectiveness with
administrative decentralization, is used to control states’ implementation efforts
on a sublegal level, effectively sidelining subsidiarity.
1. Weakest-Link Goods
Subsidiarity is vulnerable to being sidelined when strategies aimed at
securing weakest-link public goods involve administrative decentralization, as is
the case in the UN collective-security system. In such cases, subsidiarity’s logic
of legitimacy and the logic of effectiveness that underwrites administrative
decentralization overlap, potentially leading to a situation in which national
institutions have responsibility but lack control.
At the global level, administrative decentralization of responsibility from
the UN to nation-states seems to be the most practicable way of attaining
weakest-link goods because the central UN institutions are underresourced and
UN member states jealously guard their sovereignty. As a result of this
institution–state dynamic, UN institutions tend to outsource the
implementation of their decisions to states and, beyond the scope of the present
study, to other global actors.
In some cases, international peace and security can be maintained by
authorizing a small number of states to take enforcement action on behalf of
33
the UNSC. However, in some cases the efforts of a small number of powerful
states are insufficient. “Some global public goods can only be supplied if every
country lends a hand. Should even one country not help, the entire effort may
34
fail.” Regarding the eradication of smallpox in 1979, for example, “if even one
35
country had not eliminated smallpox, the entire effort would have failed.”
The UN has adopted similar reasoning to prevent terrorism. The UN
Secretary General’s report Uniting Against Terrorism emphasized that
“[t]errorists exploit weaknesses in both developing and developed States to
fund, organize, equip and train their recruits, carry out their attacks, and hide
from arrest. Building capacity in all States must therefore be the cornerstone of

33. See generally DAN SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THE DELEGATION BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL OF ITS CHAPTER VII
POWERS (1999) (detailing the legal framework for the delegation by the UNSC of its Chapter VII
powers). For critical assessments, see Niels Blokker, Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and
Practice of the UN Security Council to Authorize the Use of Force by ‘Coalitions of the Able and
Willing’, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 541 (2000); see also John Quigley, The ‘Privatization’ of Security Council
Enforcement Action: A Threat to Multilateralism, 17 Mich. J. Int’l L. 249 (1996).
34. BARRETT, supra note 32, at 47.
35. Id. at 4.
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the global counter-terrorism effort.” This analysis became “a core element of
the global counter-terrorism effort” in the UN’s Global Counter-Terrorism
37
Strategy. From this perspective, the project of preventing terrorism is
imperiled by the existence of states with porous borders through which CBN
matériel might pass into the hands of terrorists; states that do not or cannot
regulate financial transactions to prevent funds from reaching terrorists; and
domestic port authorities that lack the capacity to monitor and control the
containers that pass through their territory. This diagnosis brings international
terrorism among the “threats without boundaries” that were emphasized in the
UN Secretary General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’s
38
report A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.
The logic of the UN’s approach to terrorism is further elucidated by the way
transnational threats and challenges are conceptualized. Given that they are not
neatly bounded within a single state or region, “a threat to one is a threat to
39
all.” It follows that all states must take part in the solution to such problems
because “where weakest-link goods are concerned, a universal approach will
40
usually be necessary for effective action.” In a ministerial-level statement the
UNSC affirmed that “the active participation and collaboration of all” member
41
states is essential to combating terrorism. In short, weakest-link global public
goods seem to demand universal-effort solutions requiring the participation of
all states and presupposing a bounded space that can be totally controlled.
There is no room for gaps, and “whether the supply of the weakest-link global
42
public goods succeeds or fails depends on the country that does the least.” It is
not enough for the most well-resourced and capable states to level their best
efforts at the problem, or even for the majority of states to cooperate to solve
the problem. The participation of every state becomes crucial to the success of
the project.
A second feature of this strategy of prevention is that universal participation
alone is not enough; it must be the right sort of participation. If the
international space is to be completely regulated so as to prevent terrorism,
then individual participants’ efforts must, at a minimum, avoid being
counterproductive and, preferably, aim for synergy. The UN’s desire for such a
coordinated response is evident from its Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,
which the General Assembly described as “a strategy to promote
comprehensive, coordinated and consistent responses, at the national, regional
36. U.N. Secretary-General, Uniting Against Terrorism: Recommendations for a Global CounterTerrorism Strategy: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 74, U.N. Doc. A/60/285 (Apr. 27, 2006).
37. G.A. Res. 60/288, at 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288 (Sept. 8, 2006).
38. See A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, supra note 21, ¶¶ 17–23 (“[T]oday, more
than ever before, threats are interrelated.”).
39. Id. ¶ 17.
40. Nico Krisch, The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods, 108
AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 9 (2014).
41. S.C. Res. 1377, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377 (Nov. 12, 2001).
42. BARRETT, supra note 32, at 72.
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and international levels, to counter terrorism.” The UNSC’s quasi-legislative
44
45
Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004), the focus of this article, express this
strategy using the same formula of “recognizing the need to enhance
coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international
46
levels in order to strengthen a global response.” These resolutions are meant
47
to promote universal participation of UN member states and to provide a
skeleton framework for a coordinated response. The corollary of this approach
is the decentralization of the administration of collective security.
The administrative decentralization the UNSC pursues with its approach to
prevention has a logic of effectiveness that seems prima facie incompatible with
subsidiarity to the extent that national authorities are unequal to the task of
carrying out their responsibilities. Conceptualization of the problem in terms of
weakest links means that incompetent states cannot be left out of the universal
effort solution and must be transformed if the international space is to be
completely regulated. The UNSC, however, has effectuated this transformation
while simultaneously invoking the principle of subsidiarity.
2. Transforming Incompetent States
While the UNSC’s prevention strategy centers on its quasi-legislative
resolutions, positive international legal norms alone cannot address the
problem of states that are unable or unwilling to carry out their obligations. If a
state were to be avowedly unwilling to shoulder its responsibilities and
transform its domestic sphere, it is possible that Chapter VII measures could be
48
taken to enforce the UNSC’s decisions. The UNSC has acknowledged that
such a solution would be unsuitable for the more numerous group of states that
are merely unable to implement the resolutions. It recognized “that some States
may require assistance in implementing the provisions” because they lack “the
legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources
49
for fulfilling the” provisions. The emphasis on assistance rather than
enforcement seems to have been a response to the wider membership’s fears
that the UNSC was attempting to act as a world government in passing quasi50
legislation. UNSC members seemed to accept that an iron-fisted approach to
implementation was incompatible with their goals of securing states’ active
51
involvement and avoiding grudging participation and resistance. This attitude
43. G.A. Res. 60/288, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288 (Sept. 8, 2006).
44. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
45. S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
46. S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
47. See U.N. Charter, art. 25; see also id. ¶ 1 (stating that U.N. members agree to carry out
Security Council decisions).
48. Rosand, supra note 29, at 587.
49. S.C. Res. 1540, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc S/Res/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004). A similar statement on terrorist
financing was made in S.C. Res. 1377, at 3, U.N. Doc S/Res/1377 (Nov. 12, 2001).
50. See infra Part II.A.
51. See Statement of the German representative, UNSC Meeting Record UN Doc. S/PV.4950, 18
(Apr. 22 2004) (explaining that proponents sought to “increase [Resolution 1540’s] acceptance and
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accords with an insight of Foucault, who thought that “if you are too violent,
52
you risk provoking revolts.” Foucault studied the forms of power that replaced
this sort of repressive enforcement of the sovereign will. He gave the label
“disciplinary power” to the first distinct genre of these power relations that he
53
identified.
The UNSC’s approach to implementing its quasi-legislative resolutions
bears a striking resemblance to the apparatuses Foucault examined in
54
Discipline and Punish. Disciplinary power has various hallmarks that are
identifiable in UNSC strategies to promote implementation. In particular, the
disciplinary logic of treating individuals as components within a machine
resonates with the UNSC’s desire for a universal-effort solution to prevent
55
terrorism. Individuals become effective components of disciplinary institutions
through a process of “normalization” based on “an optimal model that is
56
constructed in terms of a certain result.” The instrumental value of building
this optimal capacity in individuals is manifested in the increased efficacy of the
common efforts in which they are engaged. In Foucault’s words, discipline
57
operates by “composing forces in order to obtain an efficient machine.” In this
way, it shares the logic of effectiveness of administrative decentralization and
“allows both the characterization of the individual as individual and the
ordering of a given multiplicity. It is the first condition for the control and use
58
of an ensemble of distinct elements.”
As discipline brings distinct elements into a coherent whole, it becomes
totalizing. That is, “The first action of discipline is in fact to circumscribe a
space in which its power and the mechanisms of its power will function fully and
59
without limit.” In the UNSC’s approach to implementation, this is manifest in
its focus on eradicating gaps and remedying deficiencies and in the logical
requirement of creating an entirely regulated space in order to prevent
terrorism. Furthermore, discipline achieves such momentous transformations by

thereby contribute to its full and global implementation”); see also Statements of the French, U.K., and
U.S. representatives, UNSC Meeting Record UN Doc. S/PV.4950, 8, 12, 17 (Apr. 22 2004) (stressing
that the resolution was not passed under Chapter VII to bring into play the Council’s enforcement
powers).
52. Michel Foucault, The Eye of Power, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE 146, 155 (C. Gordon ed., 1980)
[hereinafter Foucault, Eye of Power].
53. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 2, at 182.
54. Id.
55. See S.C. Res. 2199, supra note 3.
56. MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY AND POPULATION: LECTURES AT THE
COLLEGE DE FRANCE 1977–78 85 (Graham Burchell trans., 2009). While apologizing for the
“barbaric” term “normalization,” Foucault used the term to refer to the process of transforming
individuals subject to disciplinary power into units within a larger functional whole. In Discipline and
Punish he discussed this primarily in relation to the prison, but he also suggested that other institutions
such as factories, schools, and the army work in a similar way. Id. at 57.
57. Foucault, Eye of Power, supra note 52, at 164.
58. Id. at 149.
59. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 2, at 44–45.
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carefully avoiding controversy. It employs “minute technical inventions” that
61
Foucault described as “the other, dark side” of the formal legal framework.
They work by “extend[ing] the general forms defined by law to the infinitesimal
level” and by “enabl[ing] individuals to become integrated into [the] general
62
demands” of the law. Foucault’s notion of discipline supplies a useful
description of the mechanisms developed to assist states in the implementation
of the UNSC’s quasi-legislative resolutions. Disciplinary power relations can
help to bring about decentralized administration, but it will become clear that
discipline is not at all compatible with the principle of subsidiarity. In order to
achieve its objective of normalizing individual states, discipline sidelines
subsidiarity.
II
QUASI-LEGISLATION AND INFRA-LAW
As we have seen, the UNSC treats terrorism prevention as a weakest-link
good that requires a universal-effort solution that cannot tolerate incapacity or
incompetence. Discipline provides a useful way of remedying weak links
without appearing to coerce. Its function is to root out inadequacy and to
normalize individual states so they become useful components of a given
apparatus. In effect, the subsidiary bodies that the UNSC created to oversee
implementation of its quasi-legislation, the Counter-Terrorism Committee
(CTC) and the 1540 Committee, have developed an approach to assisting states
63
that amounts to disciplinary normalization. A former chairman of the CTC
explained, “Our aim is to raise the average level of Government performance
against terrorism around the globe. This means upgrading the capacity of each
nation’s legislation and executive machinery to fight terrorism. Every
government holds a responsibility for ensuring that there is no weak part of the
64
chain.”
This statement places the responsibility for implementation firmly on the
shoulders of nation-states, a move that echoes disciplinary power’s scrupulous
65
parsimony. The logic of effectiveness implied by the motive of administrative
decentralization provides that responsibility tends to intensify rather than relax
discipline’s ability to control individuals’ actions. Conversely, the logic of

60. Id. at 220.
61. Id. at 222.
62. Id.
63. See Isobel Roele, Disciplinary Power in the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, 19 J. CONFLICT
& SECURITY L. 49, 54 (2014) (“[N]ormalization occurs when the knowledge garnered through . . .
surveillance meets the practices of correction.”).
64. U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4453d mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4453 (Jan. 18, 2002).
65. See FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 2, at 218 (explaining that disciplines
have three characteristic features: They attempt to exercise power at the lowest possible cost,
maximizing its invisibility and minimizing objections and resistance; they want to maximize the
intensity of the effects of this power and extend it without gaps or intervals; and they link the growth of
power with the output of the apparatus within which it is exercised).
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legitimacy underlying the principle of subsidiarity suggests that national
responsibility connotes national control. The nature of discipline as infra-law
enables this doublethink by sidelining subsidiarity, which remains applicable at
the level of formal law in order to still states’ fears that the UNSC is trying to
impinge on their jurisdictional autonomy.
A. Open-Textured Quasi-Legislation
The principle of subsidiarity has been implicated in the justification and
criticism of UNSC quasi-legislation. This is easiest to see in the context of
Resolution 1540 (2004), which imposed obligations on all states to prevent CBN
66
materiel and its means of delivery from falling into the hands of terrorists. This
Resolution did not benefit from the wave of sympathy following 9/11 that
67
Resolution 1373, on terrorist financing, received. Many states vociferously
opposed the UNSC’s quasi-legislative practice as an unwanted infraction of
their jurisdictional autonomy and a disruption of the balance of competences
68
between the UNSC and the General Assembly.
There were also fears that the obligations could be coercively imposed on
69
states that were unduly creative or tardy in implementing them. Much of the
opposition was phrased in terms of states’ national control and the primacy of
70
domestic responsibility for many of the issues under discussion. These
objections make the same species of legitimacy claim underlying the principle of
subsidiarity because they assume domestic decisionmaking is more legitimate
than centralized decisionmaking by the UNSC. Proponents of the Resolution
were compelled to acknowledge the force of these concerns but not because
they shared the logic of legitimacy underlying them. Instead, they were moved
by a logic of effectiveness that requires the cooperation of all UN members with
the quasi-legislation and, therefore, had to address members’ concerns in order
to “increase [quasi-legislation’s] acceptance and thereby contribute to its full
71
and global implementation.” The logics of effectiveness and legitimacy support
the same result of national responsibility for implementation. The problem is
that far from ensuring national control, the principle of subsidiarity helps to
diminish it by providing a façade of legitimation.
66. S.C. Res. 1540, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
67. See Ian Johnstone, The Security Council as Legislature, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND
THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY 80, 90 (Bruce Cronin & Ian Hurd eds., 2008) (noting
the lack of opposition to resolution 1373 in the wake of 9/11).
68. For opposition from the Non-Aligned Movement, see U.N. SCOR, 62d Sess., 5635th mtg. at
29, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5635 (Feb. 23, 2007). For the statement from India, see U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess.,
4950th mtg. at 23, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4956 (Apr. 22, 2004). For the statement from Namibia, see U.N.
SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. (Resumption1) at 17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (Apr. 22, 2004).
69. For the Non-Aligned Movement’s statement, see U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg.
(Resumption 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (Apr. 22, 2004).
70. For India’s statement, see U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6518th mtg. at 3–4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6518
(Apr. 20, 2011); for statements from Norway, see U.N. SCOR, 62d Sess., 5635th mtg. (Resumption 1) at
2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5635 (Feb. 23, 2007); for statement from Brazil, see id. at 14.
71. U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 18, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (Apr. 22, 2004).
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Statements given at the UNSC in support of the resolution by its sponsors
include justifications based on both effectiveness and legitimacy. Regarding
effectiveness, for instance, the Russian representative explained that a UNSC
resolution was necessary “to ensure the coordination of action” and to establish
72
“an operational framework for international cooperation.” The U.S.
representative was in agreement, adding that “it is essential that all States—not
just States parties to a specific treaty or supplier regime—maintain adequate
73
controls over their nuclear material, equipment and expertise.” Others
justified the UNSC’s involvement by downplaying its enforcement capability
74
and stressing its unique ability to promulgate universally binding norms.
As to legitimacy, the sponsors reassured the UN membership that although
standards were to be set at the international level, it would be for each state to
decide how implementation would take effect. For instance, the Spanish
representative stressed that “the draft resolution is not intrusive—because it
75
gives States leeway on how to internally interpret its implementation.”
Similarly, the French representative promised that “the Council is establishing
the goals, but it leaves each State free to define the penalties, legal regulations
76
and practical measures to be adopted.” These are fairly clear promises of
national control.
The promises seemed to be borne out by the open-textured language of
Resolution 1540. States’ obligations are contained in the first three operative
paragraphs. The first decides that states shall refrain from “providing any form
of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture,
77
possess, transport, transfer or use” CBN weapons and their means of delivery.
The second paragraph decides that states shall “adopt and enforce effective
78
laws which prohibit” nonstate actors from doing these things. And the third
paragraph decides that “all States shall take and enforce effective measures to
79
establish domestic controls to prevent” CBN proliferation. Operative
paragraph three gives a little more detail about what sorts of controls are
intended in four sub-paragraphs that require states to develop measures to
account for and secure relevant materials, to develop physical-protection
measures, to develop border security and law-enforcement capacity to counter
the trafficking of relevant materials, and to develop national export and
80
transshipment controls. None of these prescriptions is fleshed out in the text of

72. U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4956th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4956 (Apr. 28, 2004).
73. Id. at 5.
74. For statements made by the United Kingdom and Spain, see id. at 7. For statements made by
France, see id. at 8–9.
75. U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (Apr. 22, 2004).
76. Id. at 8.
77. S.C. Res. 1540, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc S/Res/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
78. Id. ¶ 2.
79. Id. ¶ 3
80. Id.
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Resolution 1540, which specifies only that the measures taken be “effective.”
This factor was material to many states’ support for the resolution. For instance,
Pakistan stated that its concerns that the UNSC was attempting to “assume the
stewardship of global non-proliferation and disarmament issues” were allayed
because 1540 “does not seek to prescribe specific legislation, which is left to
82
national action by States.”
83
Resolution 1373 is also open textured. The three pertinent paragraphs of
1373 are only slightly more detailed than those of 1540. The first obliges states
to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts, to criminalize the
provision or collection of funds for terrorist activities, to freeze the funds of
those who commit or participate in terrorist activities, and to prohibit those
over whom they have jurisdiction from making funds or other services available
84
to terrorists directly or indirectly. The second paragraph lists seven obligations
for states: to refrain from providing active or passive support to terrorists, to
prevent the commission of terrorist acts, to deny safe haven to supporters of
terrorism, to prevent terrorists from using their territories to launch attacks
against other states, to ensure that those involved in terrorist activities are
brought to justice, to cooperate with other states in criminal investigations and
proceedings against terrorists, and to take effective border-control measures to
85
prevent the movement of terrorists. The third paragraph is not binding but
exhorts states to take measures to grease the wheels of cooperation and to
respect various international-law norms, including those relating to human86
rights and refugee law.
On their face, the provisions of the quasi-legislative resolutions leave states
broad interpretive discretion even though positive action is required to
implement them. This impression has led some to suggest that the resolutions
are commensurate with the principle of subsidiarity because they respect states’
jurisdictional autonomy and strike a proportionate balance between central
standard-setting and local implementation. States retain “a meaningful degree
of jurisdictional authority because they enjoy flexibility in the way they
implement the SC legislation and participate thus in the law-making process
together with the Security Council, without, however, deviating from the
87
common goal.” The principle of subsidiarity, then, has increased the legitimacy
of the UNSC’s controversial quasi-legislative practices in the minds of
academics as well as states. Formally speaking, states have control over the way

81. Id.
82. U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4956th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4956 (Apr. 28, 2004).
83. The term “open-textured” alludes to H.L.A. Hart’s work in The Concept of Law. See H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124–35 (2d ed. 1994).
84. S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
85. Id. ¶ 2.
86. Id. ¶ 3.
87. Nicholas Tsagourias, Security Council Legislation, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, and the
Principle of Subsidiarity, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 539, 555 (2011).
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they implement their obligations because of the open-textured nature of the
quasi-legislation’s legal provisions.
B. Infra-Law
A different picture emerges when looking beneath the surface of the
resolutions at the techniques and mechanisms that have been developed to
assist states with their implementation efforts. These supportive initiatives do
not belong to the world of formal law but instead to what Foucault called “infra
88
law.” Typically, they rely on expert technical knowledge to rescale the broad
obligations imposed on UN member states for the operational level of border
guards, police units, and financial regulators. These technical efforts to enhance
and support states’ implementation efforts are disciplinary in nature. They
suggest what Foucault called a “code of normalization” rather than a code of
89
law; they are a jurisprudence of “clinical knowledge.” They condition “the
underside of law,” complementing the hard formal law of the resolutions by
seeming “to constitute the same type of law on a different scale, thereby making
90
it more meticulous.” The disciplinary practices just described help to square
the UNSC’s allocation of competence to the national level with the suggestion
that “the supply of subsidiarity will be higher in regimes dealing with issues
91
without international repercussions.” Just as one might expect with critically
important weakest-link goods, such as the prevention of CBN proliferation and
international terrorism, the jurisdictional autonomy of states is more limited
than it first appears.
Effectively implementing the UNSC’s scheme of administrative
decentralization has required many states to take positive measures to comply
with its quasi-legislative resolutions, and a large proportion of these states have
needed technical and financial assistance in order to do so. The UNSC accepted
92
this early on after the passage of Resolution 1373, and Resolution 1540
expressly recognized that many states would require implementation
93
assistance. The UNSC’s strategy for achieving implementation eschews the
coercive enforcement of legal norms and replaces it with technical norms and
learning processes coordinated by its subsidiary bodies: the CTC and 1540
Committee. Initially, these bodies were charged with monitoring states’
implementation to identify any weak links and gaps in implementation. Later
they were given a broader mandate to assist states’ implementation efforts.
Resolution 1977 encouraged “all States to prepare on a voluntary basis national
implementation action plans, with the assistance of the 1540 Committee as
88. See infra Part II.B.
89. MICHEL FOUCAULT, SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE
FRANCE 1975–76 38 (David Macey trans., 2003).
90. See Foucault, Eye of Power, supra note 52, at 222.
91. Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 5, at 17.
92. See S.C. Res. 1377, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377 (Nov. 12, 2001) (inviting states to inform the
CTC of areas in which they need support implementing Resolution 1373).
93. S.C. Res. 1540, ¶7, U.N. Doc S/Res/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
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appropriate, mapping out their priorities and plans for implementing the key
94
provisions of Resolution 1540.” Similarly, the CTC has been asked by the
UNSC to help states and regional organization draft counterterrorism strategies
95
to further the implementation of 1373. The two functions of monitoring and
assistance are complementary; the identification of weak links leads to
assistance and not punishment. The subcommittees share an “essentially
96
corrective” approach—characteristic of disciplinary power—which seeks out
deficiencies in states’ implementation efforts and remedies them so as to
normalize states into effective components of the UNSC’s universal-effort
solution.
97
The subcommittees take on very little of this work themselves. They
outsource the provision of technical assistance to myriad expert and technical
agencies within and outside of the UN family, including the FATF. The 1540
Committee was asked to “liaise on the availability of programmes which might
98
facilitate the implementation of resolution,” instead of passively requesting
99
information from other organizations and states. The CTC’s instruction was to
“facilitate technical assistance, specifically by promoting engagement between
100
providers of capacity-building assistance and recipient.” In carrying out their
mandates, the committees act as conduits between the formal legal norms
contained in the UNSC resolutions and the technical infra-law produced in the
form of best practices, training manuals, legislative models, and other forms of
expert guidance.
101
Just as discipline operates on the basis of an optimal model, the
committees compose implementation ideals by singling out certain norms and
institutions as technically authoritative. This work has been undertaken
pursuant to UNSC mandates to “explore with States and international, regional
102
and sub-regional organizations experience-sharing and lessons learned,” and,
103
in 2008, the Council decided that the Committee should undertake such work.
In 2011, this was taken further when the 1540 Committee was provided with a
Group of Experts and charged with the task of “identify[ing] effective practices,
templates and guidance, with a view to develop[ing] a compilation, as well as to
consider preparing a technical reference guide about Resolution 1540 (2004), to

94. S.C. Res. 1977, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1977 (Apr. 20, 2011).
95. S.C. Res. 2129, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2129 (Dec. 17, 2013).
96. Foucault, Eye of Power, supra note 52, at 179.
97. For a study of disciplinary power in the work of the CTC, see generally Isobel Roele,
Disciplinary Power in the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, 19 J. OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY L. 49
(2014).
98. S.C. Res. 1977, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1977 (Apr. 20, 2011).
99. See S.C. Res. 1810, ¶ 5, 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1810 (Apr. 25, 2008).
100. S.C. Res. 2129, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2129 (Dec. 17, 2013).
101. See supra Part I.B.2.
102. S.C. Res. 1673, ¶ 5(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1673 (Apr. 27, 2006).
103. See S.C. Res. 1810, ¶ 11(d), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1810 (Apr. 25, 2008) (encouraging the 1540
Committee to “engage actively with States and . . . promote the sharing of experience”).
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104

be used by States on a voluntary basis.” The CTC’s process of refining the
provisions of 1373 is more sophisticated, as it has had longer to respond to the
UNSC’s requests that it “bear in mind all international best-practices, codes and
105
106
standards” and compile a directory of them. In response, the CTC has
produced a strikingly comprehensive and detailed Directory of International
107
Best Practices, Codes and Standards,
and a Technical Guide to
Implementation structured around the first three operative paragraphs of
108
Resolution 1373. Notably, this Technical Guide forms the basis of the CTC’s
detailed implementation surveys that monitor states’ implementation of their
1373 obligations.
The loose coordinating, curating, and orchestrating roles of the CTC and
1540 Committee are commensurate with discipline’s nature as a form of
capillary power. Discipline is most easily understood by homing in on one of the
myriad capillaries through which it flows. The final part of this article traces
disciplinary power into the work of the FATF, which plays a role in the
implementation of Resolutions 1373 and 1540. The case study reveals how the
apparent jurisdictional autonomy afforded to states in these resolutions is
effectively displaced by technical prescriptions. This is made possible by the
paralleling of the logics of effectiveness and legitimacy. The disciplinary
interventions on the underside of the law, which share the logic of effectiveness
of the UNSC’s project of administrative decentralization, are obscured by the
principle of subsidiarity at the level of the formal legal norm. For all its
persistence at this formal level, subsidiarity has no traction in the nonformal
realm of infra-law, and discipline effectively sidelines it.
III
CASE STUDY: THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE
109

The FATF is an inter-governmental body established by the G7 in 1989.
Today, its membership has expanded to thirty-four states, the European
110
Commission, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Its initial focus was anti–
money laundering (AML), and, in 1990, it produced forty recommendations to
111
address the problem. In 2001, its remit was expanded to include countering
104. S.C. Res. 1977, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1977 (Apr. 20, 2011).
105. S.C. Res. 1456, ¶ 4(iii), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (Jan. 20, 2003).
106. S.C. Res. 1566, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Nov. 12, 2001).
107. U.N. Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1373 (2001) Directory of International Best Practices, Codes and Standards (2011),
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/bptable.html.
108. Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate, Technical Guide to the Implementation of
Resolution 1373 (2009), http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/technical_guide_2009.pdf.
109. For a short history of the FATF’s creation, see FATF, Who We Are, http://www.fatfgafi.org/about/ (last visited May 16, 2016).
110. FATF, Members and Observers, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/membersandobservers/ (last
visited May 16, 2016).
111. FATF, History of the FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/historyofthefatf/ (last visited May
16, 2016).
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the financing of terrorism (CFT), and it published an additional Nine Special
112
113
Recommendations on Terrorist Financing. The “40+9 Recommendations”
are regularly updated and are supported by well-developed disciplinary
mechanisms, practices, techniques, and tactics.
Despite the FATF’s narrow membership, its recommendations are intended
to have universal effect. Rather than expand its own membership in order to
achieve this, over 180 states belong to eight FATF-Style Regional Bodies
114
(FSRBs),
which monitor and assist states’ implementation of the
recommendations. Remarkably, the FATF also holds states that are neither
FATF nor FSRB members to its recommendations. Its stated mission is to
“identify national-level vulnerabilities” and, to this end, to identify and engage
“with high-risk, non-co-operative jurisdictions and those with strategic
deficiencies in their national regimes” that pose a threat to the financial
115
system’s integrity.
The FATF shares the UNSC’s totalizing logic of
effectiveness that tolerates no weak links, so it is, perhaps, no surprise that its
technical recommendations form part of the infra-law of 1373 and 1540. This
has occurred through their incorporation as best practices by the UNSC’s
subsidiary bodies. They feature heavily in the CTC’s directory and Technical
116
Guide to the Implementation of Resolution 1373. The FATF has also been
expressly endorsed by the UNSC, which encouraged the CTC to “work closely
117
with the FATF, including in the FATF’s mutual-evaluations process.” Since
2007, it has also been active in the area of the financing of CBN proliferation,
118
and, in 2013, it published guidance on the implementation of Resolution 1540.
119
The FATF’s work in this area has been noted by the UNSC and the body has
112. Id.
113. FATF, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of
Terrorism & Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations (2012), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/
fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf
[hereinafter
The
FATF
Recommendations].
114. These are: The Asia-Pacific Group, the Caribbean FATF, MONEYVAL (under the auspices
of the Council of Europe), the Eurasian Group, the Eastern and Southern Africa AML Group, the
Inter-Governmental Action Group of West Africa, the Middle East and North Africa FATF, and the
FATF of Latin America. There are currently plans for a ninth FSRB to cover Central Africa, the
GABAC. For information on the FSRBs and the list of FATF Associate Members, see FATF, FATF
Members and Observers, supra note 110.
115. FATF, Financial Action Task Force Mandate (2012–2020), art. 3(d) (2012), http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FINAL%20FATF%20MANDATE%202012-2020.pdf
[hereinafter
FATF Mandate].
116. See Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate, supra note 108, at 3 (stating that
implementation of the measures in 1373 “should be guided by the . . . norms and standards set out in
the 40 Recommendations and Nine Special Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on
Money Laundering (FATF), which has achieved broad recognition as the authoritative international
body for the development and adoption of standards relating to money-laundering and terrorist
financing”).
117. S.C. Res. 2129, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2129 (Dec. 17, 2013).
118. FATF, The Implementation of Financial Provisions of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions to Counter the Proliferation of WMD 3 (2013), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/
documents/recommendations/Guidance-UNSCRS-Prolif-WMD.pdf.
119. See S.C. Res. 1977, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1977 (Apr. 20, 2011) (noting “the guidance of the
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been invited to brief the subcommittees on financing issues, but none of the
UNSC resolutions contains a decision that makes the FATF’s recommendations
formally binding on all states.
The FATF works on the underside of 1540 and 1373 to ensure that all states
have the capacity to play their part in protecting “the integrity of the
121
international financial system.” Its practices are characteristically disciplinary,
employing prescription, monitoring, and correction to normalize states. Apart
from publishing and disseminating its recommendations, it produces an
abundance of technical guidance for their implementation. In order to see that
they are implemented, it uses repeated mutual-evaluation reports, which subject
states to constant supervision. Finally, its uses both carrots and sticks to correct
any deficiencies it finds by ranking states according to the progress they have
made. The cumulative effect of these processes is to radically diminish national
control over the implementation of states’ obligations while constantly
reasserting national responsibility to implement, which then acts as a motor for
normalization.
A. Prescriptions
Foucault explained how disciplinary power focuses on the “control of
122
123
activity” through the “elaboration of the act.” Discipline is not satisfied with
the open-textured UNSC resolutions because national control over their
interpretation is inimical to normalization according to an optimal model. The
124
model serves “as a common standard, a basic principle of comparison” and is
constructed from microprescriptions that leave little room for interpretation.
The FATF shares this logic. It seeks to homogenize states’ AML and CFT
measures, “closing down regulatory arbitrage” so as to prevent actors from
125
exploiting disparities in regulatory standards. This is achieved by breaking
down the legal norms into microprescriptions through multiple tiers of
increasingly detailed prescriptions.
The first tier of infra-law is formed by the recommendations themselves,
which, since there are forty-nine of them, already remove much of the
ambiguity in the open-textured subparagraphs of the quasi-legislative
resolutions to which they are relevant. The next tier is made up of technical
guidance for implementing the recommendations, which is itself broken down

framework” of the FATF).
120. See Joint Open Briefing of the Chairs of the Security Council Committees and the President of
the FATF (Nov. 18, 2013), http://webtv.un.org/meetings-events/watch/joint-open-briefing-of-the-chairsof-the-security-council-committees-and-the-president-of-the-fatf/2851464364001#full-text.
121. FATF Mandate, supra note 115, art. 1(2).
122. Foucault, Eye of Power, supra note 52, at 149.
123. Id. at 151.
124. François Ewald, Norms, Discipline and the Law, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 138, 148 (1990).
125. Roger Wilkins, Objectives for the Australian Presidency of the FATF XXVI 2014–15 2,
http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/Objectives%20for%20FATF%20XXVI%202014%20201
5.pdf.
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into several strata. The first stratum comprises “interpretive notes” to each
recommendation that form part of the FATF standards and are intended to be
mandatory except when they use examples that are intended only to give
127
guidance. The second stratum comprises detailed Guidance and Best Practices
papers published on specific recommendations, such as the guidance on
transparency and beneficial ownership that corresponds to Recommendations
128
24 and 25, as well as guidance on cross-cutting issues, such as the recent rise in
129
prepaid cards, mobile payments, and Internet-based payment services. The
third stratum is constituted by typology reports in the form of research papers
on highly specific issues, such as the relevance of the diamond trade to AML
130
131
and CFT or of the trafficking of Afghan opiates. None of these documents
has binding force as formal law; they are published as technical assistance.
Nevertheless, they produce a densely textured optimal model for
implementation that reduces national control of implementation.
States’ loss of control over interpretation is compounded because most
states have little input into FATF’s processes of norm-creation. Not only are
many of the norms classed as technical rather than political, but states’ input is
132
also limited because of the FATF’s club-like composition. Less than one-fifth
of UN member states are members of the FATF, which has a reputation as a
133
particularly exclusive body. The criteria for FATF membership exclude most
states because members must be “strategically important” both quantitatively,
in terms of their gross domestic product and financial sectors, and qualitatively,
in terms of their impact on the global financial system and their participation in
134
135
FSRBs. India was the last state to meet these criteria, in 2010. FATF
decisions are rolled out to jurisdictions through eight FSRBs in which most, but
not all, UN member states participate. Since the FATF’s avowed goal is to
protect the integrity of the financial system, there is no opting out of the

126. The FATF Recommendations, supra note 113, at 31.
127. Id. at 8.
128. FATF, Guidance on Transparency and Beneficial Ownership 3 (2014), http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-transparency-beneficial-ownership.pdf.
129. FATF, Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Prepaid Cards, Mobile Payments and
Internet-Based Payment Services (2013), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommen
dations/Guidance-RBA-NPPS.pdf.
130. FATF, Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing through Trade in Diamonds (2013),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/methodsandtrends/documents/ml-tf-through-trade-in-diamonds.html
(last visited May 16, 2016).
131. FATF, Financial Flows Linked to the Production and Trafficking of Afghan Opiates (2014),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/methodsandtrends/documents/financial-flows-afghan-opiates.html (last
visited May 16, 2016).
132. See Peter Romaniuk, Institutions as Swords and Shields: Multilateral Counter-Terrorism Since
9/11, 36 REV. INT’L STUD. 591, 602 (2010) (noting that the FATF operates like a club by developing
rules that suit strong states “but involve high adjustment costs for weak states”).
133. See Krisch, supra note 40, at 23 (describing the FATF as a “classical club organization”).
134. FATF, Membership Policy (2015), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersan
observers/fatfmembershippolicy.html (last visited May 16, 2016).
135. FATF, Countries: India. http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/#India (last visited May 16, 2016).
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recommendations, and the FATF applies them to states that are not members
of FSRBs even though these states have had absolutely no opportunity to
participate in the standard-setting processes.
Even states that are members of FSRBs lack control over the standardsetting process when they are not also members of the FATF itself. Non-FATF
jurisdictions can participate in FATF decision-making processes only if their
FSRBs meet certain criteria. Even if they do, there is little scope for critical
voices, as FSRBs “should endorse the FATF Recommendations and mutual
evaluation related material as interpreted by the FATF, and support other
related FATF material and policies, such as best practice papers, guidance, and
136
policy papers.” These commitments ensure that the FSRBs channel the
various strata of FATF prescriptions down to the regional level with the
minimum amount of divergence. Given the FATF’s desire to eradicate
regulatory arbitrage, the FSRBs are less about promoting regional pluralism
than about diminishing its effect on the implementation of the
recommendations. There is a clear pecking order between the FATF and its
regional bodies, as reflected in the first principle of High Level Agreement that
governs relations between them. The agreement states, “The FATF is the only
standard-setting body and the guardian and arbiter of the application of its
137
standard.” The two-tier system of membership is difficult to square with the
138
principles of global administrative law, particularly because, at least initially,
“non-members were voiceless in the process of crafting the FATF
139
recommendations.” While the FATF made efforts to consult more widely
when the recommendations were revised in 2012, no qualitative changes were
made, and the revision was limited to expanding the existing approach to
140
include new and emerging threats to the integrity of the financial system.
Another factor that diminishes national control over implementation is the
technical, rather than political, character of FATF norms. An integral part of
the way the FATF normalizes states is “through the dissemination of
141
National control is
knowledge-based technologies of Government.”
136. FATF, High-Level Principles & Objectives for FATF and FATF-Style Regional Bodies 4–5
(2012), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/High-Level%20Principles%20and%20Objectives
%20for%20FATF%20and%20FSRBs.pdf.
137. Id. at 1.
138. See Jarred Wessel, The Financial Action Task Force: A Study in Balancing Sovereignty and
Equality in Global Administrative Law, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 169, 170 (2006) (arguing that
“jurisdictions affected by its policies, accept less ‘pure’ forms of sovereignty, deliberative equality, and
command–and–control regulation over the civil liberties/security tradeoff”); see also Navin Beekarry,
The International Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Regulatory
Strategy, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 137, 189 (2011) (citing Thomas M. Franck when writing that the
“fundamental principle underpinning the concept of legitimacy in policy-making is the recognition that
subjects of international norms should have an opportunity to participate and influence the
development of those norms”).
139. Kenneth S. Blazejewski, The FATF and its Institutional Partners, 22 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J.
1, 44 (2008).
140. The FATF Recommendations, supra note 113, at 8–9.
141. Yee-Kuang Heng & Ken McDonagh, The Other War on Terror Revealed, 34 REV. INT’L STUD.
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diminished both by the consequent depoliticization of the norms and by the
desire to have up-to-date technical knowledge. The FATF prides itself on
keeping its recommendations up-to-date, and its prescriptions are subject to
continuous updating and improvement to keep pace with changes in
technology, knowledge, and the practices of money launderers and terrorist
142
financiers. As a consequence, the process of normalization is open-ended
because its logic of effectiveness demands that it take account of the latest
technical developments. The FATF’s “typologies” research continually tweaks
the optimal model of interpretation in the light of research conducted by
143
experts from FATF member states. This research also tends to expand the
FATF’s sphere of competence by seeking out “new trends or methods in misuse
144
of the financial system.” As the FATF’s remit grows, so national control of
implementation diminishes. This effect is exacerbated because the FATF’s
145
reliance on research produces a “depoliticised expert orthodoxy.” Typology
reports are not purely descriptive, and they feed into the process of drafting
prescriptive guidance. For instance, a recent report on the risk of terrorist abuse
of nonprofit organizations will inform the revision of the guidance on
146
combating the abuse of nonprofits as required by Recommendation Eight.
The research-driven nature of changes to the FATF’s prescriptions displays a
logic of effectiveness operating according to an underlying assumption that
technical knowledge is objective and therefore universally applicable.
Subsidiarity is sidelined by these prescriptions because such an approach to
knowledge is blind to any legitimacy issues.
B. Mutual Evaluation Reports
The FATF’s technical, multilayer prescriptions are given normalizing effect
by technologies of surveillance. Surveillance is perhaps the most recognizable
element of disciplinary power, particularly in the form of Bentham’s
147
panopticon, which operated according to a principle of “omni-visibility.” Less
emblematic, but a just-as-important tool of surveillance, is the examination that
553, 572 (2008).
142. See The FATF Recommendations, supra note 113, at 9.
143. See FATF, Annual Report 2013–14, at 14, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
brochuresannualreports/FATF%20Annual%20report%202013-2014.pdf [hereinafter FATF Annual
Report] ( “The FATF’s work to identify and analyse these risks, trends and methods, or typologies
work, ensures that the FATF standards are up to date and that new policy or guidance is developed if
and when necessary. Typologies work builds on the experience and knowledge of those operating in
such fields, as law enforcement and investigation, as well as financial intelligence.”).
144. Id.
145. Valsamis Mitsilegas, The European Union and the Global Governance of Crime, in
GLOBALISATION, CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THEORETICAL, COMPARATIVE AND
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 178 (Valsamis Mitsilegas, Peter Alldridge & Leonidas Cheliotis eds.,
2015).
146. FATF, Risk of Terrorist Abuse in Non-Profit Organisations 9 (2014), http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Risk-of-terrorist-abuse-in-non-profit-organisations.pdf.
147. MICHEL FOUCAULT, PSYCHIATRIC POWER: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE 1973–
1974 48 (Graham Burchell trans., 2008).

9-ROELE INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE)

210

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

5/17/2016 5:47 PM

[Vol. 79:189
148

“transformed the economy of visibility into the exercise of power.” The
examination measures conformity with the prescribed model in order to
identify and remedy deficiency. The FATF makes extensive use of assessments
in the form of Mutual Evaluation Reports (MERs). These reports monitor
states’ implementation of the recommendations on a rolling basis in order to
identify deficiencies that could jeopardize the integrity of the global financial
system. MERs are intended to help states to improve their performance by
highlighting shortcomings and priority areas of action. The evaluation process is
iterative, and subsequent evaluations assess the extent to which a state has
made the improvements required as measured against the optimal model
constituted by the FATF’s technical microprescriptions.
All members of the FATF and its FSRBs are subject to MERs conducted
according to a methodology that measures the effectiveness of implementation
149
as well as basic technical compliance with the recommendations. The FATF
takes evaluation very seriously, and no state is immune from findings of
noncompliance or ineffectiveness. This reflects the nature of the FATF’s project
as a universal-effort solution to the problems of AML and CTF. For example,
the MER by the United States for the third round of FATF evaluations in 2006
revealed several shortcomings and ended in a lengthy action plan for
150
improvement before the fourth round in 2016. Of the forty-nine categories,
the United States was assessed as “compliant,” meaning no further work was
151
necessary, in only fifteen of them. It was found to be noncompliant, indicating
major shortcomings, in four categories, including in the beneficial ownership of
152
property and the regulation of casinos and other nonfinancial institutions.
One of the findings of noncompliance related to Recommendations Five—on
customer due diligence—and ten—on record-keeping—because so-called
designated nonfinancial business and professions, such as casinos, accountants,
lawyers, dealers in precious metals, and real estate agents are not subject to
sufficient customer-identification and record-keeping obligations. In its action
plan, the United States was advised that it should “explicitly require casinos to
perform enhanced due diligence for higher risk categories of customers” and
“extend customer identification, record keeping and account monitoring
153
obligations” to all other designated nonfinancial business and professions.
Thus, even U.S. national control over implementation is affected by the MERs.
The FATF attempts to convert the action plans into concrete improvements
by including a follow-up process to ensure that states do not simply ignore
148. Foucault, Eye of Power, supra note 52, at 187.
149. FATF, Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance with the FATF Recommendations
and the Effectiveness of AML/CFT systems 11–14 (2013), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf
/documents/methodology/FATF%20Methodology%2022%20Feb%202013.pdf.
150. FATF, Third Mutual Evaluation Report on AML and CFT: United States of America 304–09
(June 23, 2006), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20US%20full.pdf.
151. Id. at 299–303.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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them. National control is most extensively diminished when a state has failed to
progress from the follow-up process designed to ensure the recommended
improvements are made. In this formal follow-up process the assessed state
reports to the FATF Plenary on the steps it has taken to address its deficiencies.
A state can be removed from follow-up only after by submitting a formal
154
application for a finding that it is, at least, largely compliant. As Turkey’s
experience illustrates, the process of removal is not a mere formality. Instead,
states must demonstrate the detailed measures they have taken to rectify the
deficiency. In October 2014, the FATF published its fifteenth follow-up report
155
on Turkey’s 2007 MER. The aim of the follow-up process is to raise Turkey’s
level of compliance across the recommendations to a status of largely
compliant.
The episode illustrates the tremendous depth the FATF’s corrective process
reaches. A sticking point in its action plan had been Turkey’s criminalization of
terrorist financing as required by Resolution 1373 and the FATF Special
156
Recommendation II. Turkey had adopted a terrorist financing law in order to
implement its obligations, but the FATF found it to be ineffective and deficient
in a number of respects, including in the detailed definition of the actus reus
and mens rea of the offense and of the sanctions available on conviction. The
MER found that Turkey’s definition of terrorist funding was too narrow, as it
dealt only with financial support, and was concerned that the mental element
for the offence, “knowing and willing,” was too high a threshold. Before it
would sign off on compliance, the FATF required assurances about how
157
elements of the offence would be interpreted by Turkish courts. This
astonishing interference with Turkey’s control over the process of
implementation shows that the FATF is not satisfied with compliance on paper.
This makes sense if Turkey is seen as part of a decentralized apparatus for
regulating the global financial system; its criminal-justice system must be fit for
purpose in practice. Moreover, what counts as fit for purpose is determined by
the FATF and not the evaluated state.
C. Ranking
Examination makes it possible to rank individuals, and “discipline is an art
158
of rank, a technique for the transformation of arrangements.” The FATF
ranks states using shades of compliance: not complaint, partially compliant,

154. FATF Annual Report, supra note 143, at 11.
155. FATF, 15th Follow-Up Report on the Mutual Evaluation of Turkey (2014), http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/Turkey-FUR-2014.pdf.
156. Turkey’s mutual evaluation pre-dates the revision of the FATF Recommendations in 2012 and
is therefore measured against the old 2001 edition of the special recommendations. See FATF, FATF
IX Special Recommendations (2001), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF
%20Standards%20%20IX%20Special%20Recommendations%20and%20IN%20rc.pdf.
For
the
revised 2012 Recommendations, see The FATF Recommendations, supra note 113.
157. FATF Report on the Evaluation of Turkey, supra note 155, at 15–17.
158. Foucault, Eye of Power, supra note 52, at 146.
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largely compliant, and compliant. In disciplinary systems, ranking is
transformative and is used to correct deficiency “through the mechanics of a
159
training.” Ranking brings with it “a whole micro-economy of privileges and
160
impositions,” which can be seen in the listing practices of the FATF. Ranking
is one of the main sources of the FATF’s carrots and sticks and confounds the
notion that discipline is a wholly soft power. Although discipline does not
enforce its norms in the way that the sovereign enforces the formal law,
161
discipline establishes a small “infra-penalty” to bring the deficient into line.
Disciplinary coercions, like disciplinary norms, inhabit the obscured underside
of law. However, they are also the points at which discipline becomes most
visible and, therefore, most vulnerable to critique, as in the case of the FATF’s
practice of blacklisting noncompliant states.
The FATF names and shames noncompliant and uncooperative
162
jurisdictions with a view to mending rents in the fabric of the global financial
system. The practice, like all disciplinary punishment, is “essentially
163
corrective.” States failing to show sufficient progress in their implementation
of the recommendations are referred to the International Cooperation Review
Group (ICRG) as “high risk and non-cooperative” jurisdictions. The ICRG
process moves from the soft corrective training of technical assistance to the
hard corrective training of ranking. It is notable that “non-cooperative” refers
to something more than a total failure to engage; it can also apply to states that
164
do take the MER follow-up process sufficiently seriously. The class comprised
of the “high risk and non-cooperative,” like the other “shameful” classes with
165
which Foucault was concerned, “existed only to disappear.” It is a permanent
classification of a jurisdiction as second-class. It is a spur to improvement. The
FATF explained that “public identification of countries with serious weaknesses
in their AML–CFT measures has proven to be a powerful tool for improving
global compliance” because “it puts pressure on the countries in question to act
on and address these deficiencies in order to maintain their position in the
166
global economy.”
The infra-penalty of listing works in several different ways. First, there is a
loss of position and prestige when a state is “named and shamed” in the ICRG’s
biannual public statements. At the time of writing, the names of thirteen states
167
together with brief descriptions of their deficiencies were listed by the FATF.

159. Id. at 180.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 178.
162. See Guy Stessens, The FATF “Black List” of Non-Cooperative Countries, 14 LEIDEN J. INT’L.
L. 199, 203 (2001) (analyzing the FATF’s process of blacklisting non-cooperative jurisdictions).
163. Foucault, Eye of Power, supra note 52, at 179.
164. FATF Annual Report, supra note 143, at 22.
165. Foucault, Eye of Power, supra note 52, at 182.
166. FATF Annual Report, supra note 143, at 22.
167. The list is regularly updated. For the most recent version, see FATF, High Risk and NonCooperative Jurisdictions (2016), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/#high-risk (last visited May 16,
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Second, the list generates incentives to improve because it contains several
subcategories reflecting different shades of noncooperation. At one end are
jurisdictions subject to a FATF call for countermeasures, and at the other end
are jurisdictions no longer subject to monitoring. It is equally important for the
FATF’s purposes to advertise states’ successes as well as their failures. The
publication of the lists therefore includes something of a public ceremony of
graduation that records states’ progress moving through the shades of
noncooperation and improving compliance and, eventually, off the list
altogether. Of course, states can regress as well as improve, and at the time of
writing LAO PDR has been labelled “a jurisdiction not making sufficient
progress,” which amounts to a threat to demote it from the improving
168
category. The ICRG process is an excellent example of “this play of
quantification, this circulation of plus and minus points, [by which] the
disciplinary apparatuses hierarchized the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ subjects in relation to
169
one another.”
A third aspect of the infra-penalty of listing is the FATF’s practice of calling
for countermeasures as a tangible sanction for noncooperation. Currently, only
170
Iran and North Korea are subject to these. States in the subcategory directly
above this nadir are also labelled with a warning that other states should
171
consider the risks arising from their deficiencies. At present, the three states
on this list—Algeria, Ecuador, and Myanmar—all remain members of FSRBs
and have not attempted to opt out of the system entirely, as Iran and North
172
Korea have. All the states on the noncooperative list are affected in a material
way because noncooperative equates to a status of “high risk,” and potential
trading partners are warned that they “could find that they are no longer able to
173
do business with [the listed states] at all.” FATF Recommendation Nineteen
requires financial institutions “to apply enhanced due diligence measures” to
174
entities from “higher risk” jurisdictions. According to the interpretive note on
this article, these measures might involve: implementing more stringent
reporting requirements; prohibiting the establishment of subsidiaries or
branches in the country concerned; and, in general, raising the cost of doing
business so as to dissuade institutions and businesses from making transactions
175
in the higher-risk jurisdiction.

2016).
168. FATF, Public Statement on Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: On-Going Process
(2015), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/documents/fatfcompliance-october-2015.html#Uganda.
169. Foucault, Eye of Power, supra note 52, at 181.
170. FATF Annual Report, supra note 143, at 23.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 22.
174. The FATF Recommendations, supra note 113, at 19.
175. Id. at 79.
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In sum, the FATF converts its technical prescriptions into measurable
behavioral changes using mechanisms of surveillance and correction in a way
that is characteristic of disciplinary systems. In the FATF system, states are
deprived of national control over the implementation of their obligations while
the system at the same time emphasizes their responsibility for implementation.
The FATF’s recommendations, like the UNSC’s quasi-legislation to which it
has become attached as infra-law, are the product of a logic of effectiveness that
seeks to transform states into effective nodes of decentralized administration of
the global financial system. The principle of subsidiarity remains present in the
open-textured drafting of the quasi-legislative provisions and the lack of
enforcement mechanisms, but it has no place on the underside of law and is
effectively sidelined by disciplinary tactics of implementation.
IV
CONCLUSION
In global governance the principle of subsidiarity has a logic of legitimacy;
responsibility is allocated to the national level in order to bring decisionmaking
closer to the human beings it affects. Sometimes, as in cases of weakest-link
goods like the prevention of transnational security challenges, a logic of
effectiveness drives the allocation of responsibility to the national level. The
UNSC concocted a universal-effort solution of decentralized administration
that strives, however unlikely in the achievement, to completely regulate
specific aspects of the international space in order to prevent terrorists from
operating. Pursuing this project led the UNSC to lay down a skeletal
framework for a common approach to the regulation of terrorist financing and
the proliferation of CBN material and its means of delivery. Concerns about the
legitimacy of this quasi-legislation means, given the UNSC’s democracy deficit,
that the UNSC has had to find ways of ensuring that states implement their
obligations without counterproductively alienating or angering them. The logic
of effectiveness underlying the UNSC’s project is echoed by the logic of
effectiveness underpinning its disciplinary power. Along with discipline’s underthe-radar modus operandi, the shared logic has rendered discipline an ideal
instrument of implementation. The problem is that discipline operates on the
underside of law and seeks to immunize itself from critical scrutiny and
challenge. The retention of the principle of subsidiarity on the surface of the
quasi-legislation tends only to entrench this situation. In effect, discipline
pursues national responsibility without national control, effectively sidelining
the principle of subsidiarity.

